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Abstract            
Within the metatheoretical debate, both realism and social constructivism claim to explain the 
behavior of actors on the international level most accurately. Constructivism claims that the logic of 
appropriateness determines behavior, whereas realism assumes behavior is defined by the logic of 
consequences. Since these theories apply to the behavior of international actors such as 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), they also provide implications for how NGO performance is 
influenced by NGO advocacy tactics that are founded on either theory’s logic: constructivism implies 
that advocacy tactics that take the logic of appropriateness into account lead to high performance. 
Realism on the other hand assumes that advocacy tactics founded on the logic of consequences lead to 
higher degrees of NGO performance. To test whether these assumptions are true, this research 
explores to what extent NGO performance is influenced by advocacy tactics. To investigate this, the 
use of two constructivist-based and two realist-based tactics that are used by the Aids Fund (AF) will 
be compared to the degree of performance of projects in Kenya and South-Africa. A comparison of 
tactics and performance suggests that in projects aimed at men who have sex with men (MSM) 
constructivist-based tactics lead to higher performance, whereas in projects directed at people using 
drugs (PUD) performance is higher when both constructivist-based and realist-based tactics are 
distributed equally. Second, the results indicate that regime type is intervening in this causal relation. 
However, although the AF purposefully takes regime type into account in order to optimize 
performance, results suggest that regime type does not improve performance. Moreover, the results 
indicate that project type should rather be intervening in the causal relation. Because project type takes 
the different needs of key populations into account, this would result in high performance.  
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1. Introduction           
The debate in international relations (IR) between realism and (social) constructivism has been 
present for decades, in which both theories claim to explain most accurately the behavior of 
international actors. Already in 1998, Reus-Smit and Price noted that the ontological and 
metatheoretical debate between rationalists (including realists) and constructivists was becoming “[…] 
the major line of contestation […]” (263) in IR. Reus-Smit and Price ascertain that in the nineties the 
‘great IR debates’ became increasingly constructivist-oriented, echoing the conceptual neglection of 
social factors such as norms, morality, culture and identities in earlier debates. Until then, debates in 
IR predominantly occurred between different schools of rational and positive theories, such as the 
(neo)liberal and the (neo)realist schools. In particular, until the late eighties neorealism was regarded 
as the dominant – if not hegemonic – theory of IR. However, the focal point of metatheoretical debates 
shifted when a) rational IR theories had proven unsuccessful in explaining the end of the Cold War 
and b) a new generation of IR scholars initiated theoretical innovation and development. In a sense, 
the new ‘constructivist turn’ – as many authors denominated the change (Checkel 1998; Finnemore 
and Sikkink 1998, 888; Reus-Smit and Price 1998) – found its origin (at least partly) in critical theory 
that sought new ways of explaining dimensions in IR that rationalist theories could not clarify (Reus-
Smit and Price 1998, 261-6).  
Since this shift towards a realist-constructivist debate, both theories’ salience has been tested 
and contested abundantly. Some scholars suggested that phenomena can best be interpreted through 
constructivism, since the behavior of actors is then determined by the logic of appropriateness, i.e. by 
normative and social, rather than material, structures. Subsequently, the social context in which actors 
participate shapes their culture, identity and norms and accordingly their behavior (Barnett 2008, 162-
4). Similarly, others claimed the power of realist and rationalist approaches. In the latter instances, the 
behavior of international actors is congruent with the logic of consequences, i.e. with the notion that 
actors pursue self-interest and rationality (Dunne and Schmidt 2008, 92-5). 
As the role of nonstate actors – such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) – is growing 
internationally, both constructivist scholars (Finnemore 1993; Risse-Kappen 1995; Thomas 2001) and 
to a lesser extent realist scholars (Schweller and Priess 1997; Snyder 1991, 10; Walt 2001) are 
increasingly paying attention to the study of nonstate actors in the field of IR. Moreover, both theories 
provide implications for what is the most effective behavior of NGOs, including advocacy behavior. 
The constructivist implication is that advocacy tactics that take the logic of appropriateness into 
account lead to higher NGO performance than those that emphasize the logic of consequences. 
Realism on the other hand implies that advocacy tactics that take the logic of consequences into 
account lead to higher performance. Yet, while many scholars have tested both metatheories’ power 
throughout the years, they have failed to test the salience of both theories by analyzing these 
implications. This research will bridge this theoretical gap by exploring the influence of various 
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constructivist-based and realist-based advocacy tactics on the degree of performance. Additionally, 
this is also relevant for optimizing future advocacy activities.  
To test whether the assumptions of either theory are true, this research aims to answer the 
question: to what extent is NGO performance influenced by advocacy tactics? This question paves the 
way for three hypotheses: 1) advocacy tactics based on constructivist notions lead to a high 
performance; 2) advocacy tactics based on realist notions lead to a high performance; and 3) advocacy 
tactics based on a combination of both theories’ notions lead to a high performance. In order to find 
evidence related to these hypotheses, four different advocacy tactics, two of which are based on 
constructivist notions and two on realist notions, that are used by the Dutch NGO Aids Fonds 
(hereinafter: Aids Fund) will be compared to the performance of the Aids Fund (AF) projects. The 
four tactics are: 1) symbolic power, 2) cognitive power (both constructivist-based), 3) social power 
and 4) monitorial power (both realist-based). Advocacy tactics and their theoretical context will be 
explained in detail in the next section of this thesis.  
The foundation central in this research is the Aids Fund / Stop Aids NOW! / Soa Aids 
Nederland (which is the full name of the Aids Fund). This NGO, that aims at the global eradication of 
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) which causes the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS), pursues its goals by setting up different projects and programs. One of these programs, the 
Bridging the Gaps program (BtG), will provide four project cases, two in Kenya and two in South-
Africa, on which the hypotheses will be tested. In order to come to a case-by-case comparison, this 
research uses the following build-up: after this introduction, the second section will clarify 
constructivism and realism. Furthermore, a set of advocacy tactics constituted on these theories will be 
derived by examining AF documentation. The subsequent section will put all these theoretical notions 
into practice and measures how in each case different constructivist-based and realist-based advocacy 
tactics are distributed, which will be measured via content analyses. Then, the performance of each 
case will be measured by investigating to what extent BtG projects have attained their goals. Both 
results will then be compared and findings on the influence of advocacy tactics on performance will be 
presented. Additionally, the intervening role of regime type and project type will be articulated. In the 
final section, results and the possibilities for future research will be discussed briefly.  
 
2. Constructivism, Realism and Advocacy      
i. Constructivism 
As a metatheory in IR, constructivism differs from other theories, such as (neo)realism and 
(neo)liberalism, by making rather idealist, ontological assumptions on how the behavior of actors in 
the international political world is shaped. Being one of the leading authors on constructivist theory, 
Checkel argues that constructivism “[…] leads to new and meaningful interpretations of international 
politics” (1998, 325) by regarding identity and the actors’ social environment as important factors for 
explaining their behavior. First, Checkel notes that the political world is determined not only by 
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material factors, but also by the social context of those material factors and the environment in which 
actors operate. This point is emphasized by other constructivist scholars as well (Adler 1997, 322; 
Reus-Smit and Price 1998, 266-7; Wendt 1995, 71-2). Second, constructivism assumes that the 
combination of material and social structures determines the identity of actors and subsequently their 
behavior. Because social factors are taken into account, agents look beyond notions of self-interest and 
profitability: they regard social structures (such as identity, values and culture) and express those 
through norms. Norms, in this sense, are defined as “[…] single standards of behavior” (Finnemore 
and Sikkink 1998, 891). Thus, normative factors – and inherently the logic of appropriateness (i.e. the 
‘right’ thing to do) – determine the behavior of actors (Checkel 1998, 325-8).  
 A third and final notion is given by Reus-Smit and Price (1998). They state that actors and the 
social structures within the actors’ environment are mutually constituted. This means that the 
structures not only determine the behavior of agents; the structures themselves, being “[…] nothing 
more than routinized discursive and physical practices” (Reus-Smit and Price 1998, 267), are similarly 
determined by the agents. Wendt calls this relation a “reciprocal interaction” (1992, 406), which makes 
the social environment of actors highly dynamic and susceptible to changes in identities, norms and as 
a result in behavior (Parsons 2010, 94-7; Reus-Smit and Price 1998, 267).  
 Within the constructivist theory, literature has appeared on norm changes and dynamics (e.g. 
Acharya 2004; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), including literature on so-called ‘norm entrepreneurs’ 
(e.g. Goddard 2009; Payne 2001) and the advocacy of norms (e.g. Carpenter 2007; Keck and Sikkink 
1999). As one of the most influential scholars on this matter, Finnemore and Sikkink note that “[…] 
one way to understand the dynamics [of norms] is by examining […] the ‘life cycle’ of norms” (1998, 
892). This model, the norm life cycle model (NLCM), is composed of three phases. First, a new norm 
comes into existence. This phase is referred to as ‘norm emergence’ and occurs because norm 
entrepreneurs, i.e. actors such as NGOs, try to establish a certain idea as a norm. These norm 
entrepreneurs undertake persuasion activities in order to make the norm more commonly accepted. If 
actors succeed in that – indeed, succeeding is not necessarily the outcome – the norm reaches the next 
phase: ‘norm cascade’. When this occurs, norm acceptance increases rapidly. When some actors 
remain dismissive of the norm, norm entrepreneurs
1
 will use different socialization tools (either by 
giving incentives or by imposing sanctions) for persuasion. If norm advocates again succeed, the norm 
reaches the phase of ‘norm internalization’, after which the norms obtains “[…] a ‘taken-for-granted’ 
quality that makes conformance with the norm almost automatic” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 904). 
The life cycle of the norm is then complete. However, when norm advocates fail in persuasion during 
any of the phases, the norm can cease to exist (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 895-905). A more 
detailed account for how persuasion can be used follows in the subsection on advocacy tactics. 
                                               
1 The term ‘norm entrepreneur’ implies that those actors only create the norm, while in fact they uphold the norm throughout 
the whole process of the NLCM (i.e. also in the second and third phase of the model, towards norm acceptance). Therefore, 
in order to be precise about the norm entrepreneurs’ work, this research will refer to ‘norm entrepreneurs’ as ‘norm 
advocates’ (Bouma 2014, 3). 
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ii. Realism 
 Contrary to constructivism, “[r]ealists are skeptical of the idea that universal moral [contexts] 
exist [...]” (Dunne and Schmidt 2008, 92). Instead, this metatheoretical school considers states as the 
main actors (rather than institutions and organizations). Realist schools argue that behavior in IR is 
primarily determined by the states’ search and struggle for security. States operate in an international 
anarchic environment, which causes them to feel continuously threatened by others. To ensure their 
survival in this state of anarchy, each state is only concerned with its self-interest and thus adopts a 
policy of power-maximization and self-help. In addition, states expect other states to behave similarly, 
because they face similar threats to their survival. Given that conflicting states’ self-interests often 
result in war (which is a direct threat to survival), the access to power capabilities is essential for states 
(Dunne and Schmidt 2008, 92-5, 100-3).  
 Within this ontological conception of how the political world is shaped, many different realist 
theories have appeared over the years, each making additional claims to interpret the core realist 
assumptions. The lineage of realist theories begins with classical realism, as set out by Morgenthau 
(1948) (and even earlier by Thucydides and Machiavelli). In his foundational work, Morgenthau 
argues that the key realist determinants, such as power-seeking and security-seeking, do not only apply 
to international politics, but to humanity as a whole due to biologically constituted notions: “[p]olitics, 
like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” 
(Morgenthau 1948, 4). Furthermore, Morgenthau emphasizes universally accepted ‘moral laws’ that 
apply to all people: in order to ensure the survival of a state, political action, similar to individual 
action, must hold moral principles
2
 such as patriotism, liberty and deliberation (or: ‘prudence’). Acting 
in accordance with moral standards will help in the defense of the state’s sovereignty (Dunne and 
Schmidt 2008, 95-8; Morgenthau 1948, 3-5, 10). 
 The more recent structural realist school differentiates between offensive and defensive 
realism. As the main author on offensive realism, Mearsheimer (2001) argues, as opposed to classical 
realism, that not human nature determines political action, but rather the constant power competition 
between great powers. Moreover, Mearsheimer assumes that states seek for global hegemony, since 
that is the best way to ensure state survival. Consequently, “[g]reat powers [...] are always searching 
for opportunities to gain power over their rivals [...]” (Mearsheimer 2001, 29). Therefore, he assumes 
that, although the goal of states is only to survive, states continuously evaluate their relative power 
position and behave offensively to enhance and protect that position (Mearsheimer 2001, 32-6). In 
contrast, defensive realism, as stipulated by Waltz (1979), rejects this intrinsic need for offensive 
behavior. According to Waltz, power-maximization is a mean to survival, but not an end in itself. 
Since security and survival are the primary goals of states, their insecurity in the anarchic world leads 
                                               
2 The emphasis on such morality may suggest some theoretical overlap with constructivism. However, this is overlap can be 
considered minimal, given that Morgenthau’s use of morality is only in support of power-maximization and thus realism. 
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to reserved behavior: states recognize that a well-designed, stable balance of power is beneficial to 
ensure survival. Offensive behavior, however, could seriously threaten or harm survival. Therefore,  
states will rather avoid such behavior (Waltz 1979, 102-28).  
Although many more realist theories have been developed, only a few have taken nonstate 
actors (such as NGOs) into account. In most realist theories it is either implied or assumed that the 
state is the prime actor in IR (Mearsheimer 2001, 17): states are considered ‘black boxes’ and 
therefore realist scholars seldom take domestic, institutional or nonstate influences into consideration. 
Unlike constructivist scholars, realists do not develop theories or models on nonstate actors using 
persuasion and advocacy that could serve in this research’s interest. Yet, that does not mean that realist 
implications cannot be applied to the study of NGO advocacy. The realist ideas of the pursuit of self-
interest, rationality and power-maximization can well be used in the study of advocacy tactics, as the 
next subsection will reveal.  
  
iii. Theoretical ‘Logics’ and Advocacy Tactics 
The previous two subsections showed the clear link between constructivist theory on the one 
hand and the study of NGOs, advocacy and norm dynamics on the other. Indeed, realists have paid 
little attention to nonstate actors (let alone how these operate), due to their focus on state actors. This 
may raise questions for the applicability of realist theory to the study of NGO behavior. However, 
these questions do not mean that realist notions can never be applied to the study of NGO advocacy 
and NGO persuasion. This point can be underscored by the Spiral Model (SpM) (Risse-Kappen and 
Sikkink 1999). In this constructivist model, that expands the notion of persuasion to norm acceptance 
as stipulated in the NLCM, the authors argue that there are two motives for persuasion: instrumental 
adaptation and argumentative adaptation. The latter, argumentative adaptation, occurs whenever actors 
accept a norm based on the logic of appropriateness: they take on the norm’s validity and thus accept 
its moral ‘truth’. This reason is an obvious constructivist-based reason for adaptation.  
Yet, instrumental adaptation rests on a logic of consequences and consequently has a realist 
basis. In this case, actors accept the norm because it is strategically and rationally the best option, 
which involves bargaining and the consideration of the consequences of nonacceptance of norms (such 
as sanctions). Actors do not accept the norm because of its validity, but because of a cost-benefit 
analysis (Risse-Kappen and Sikkink 1999, 11-4). This argumentation has a strong power-related 
connotation. Thus, while the SpM itself is designed within the context of constructivism, the study of 
persuasion can be applied outside this theoretical ‘comfort zone’, because realist elements (i.e. 
instrumental adaptation) are present, too, to explain such persuasion.
3
  
Furthermore, the broader implication of this notion is of importance for the unit of analysis in 
this research. As stated before, unlike constructivism, realism emphasizes states as the main actors. 
                                               
3 Moreover, while the SpM links persuasion specifically to norms, this research generalizes the notions of persuasion to a 
broader spectrum, since this research aims at explaining not just norm advocacy, but advocacy in general. Thus, persuasion is 
not necessarily norm persuasion in this research. 
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This narrow unit of analysis is problematic for this research, since NGO advocacy also emphasizes 
actors within and beyond the state, rather than state actors solely. Yet, the SpM underscores that this 
research barricade can be removed by stressing the theoretical differences based on their underlying 
logic only. Moreover, this focus on logical distinctions to explain the behavior of actors is also found 
in different neo-institutionalist schools. Indeed, as stipulated by March (1994) and March and Olson 
(1989), and in line with the logic of appropriateness, normative neo-institutionalism argues that the 
behavior within institutions is determined by social values, rules and identities (1994, 58-61; 1989, 
160-2). Rationalist neo-institutionalism on the other hand is congruent to the logic of consequences, 
since this school claims that a) behavior is determined by self-interest (1994, 1-3; 1989, 160-2) and b) 
“[...] action depends on anticipations of the future effects of current actions” (1994, 2). Thus, one can 
assume that this neo-institutionalist debate is similar to the IR debate in this research. By approaching 
the theoretical debate between constructivism and realism in the way neo-institutionalist schools do, 
i.e. by stressing the theories’ logics and disregarding other factors, this research is capable of 
analyzing both constructivist-based and realist-based tactics on all actors, including NGOs, local 
governments and civil societies that would otherwise have been excluded. Following from this 
approach to the constructivist-realist debate, this research focuses on four advocacy tactics:
4
 two 
tactics founded on notions of constructivism and two founded on realism. These tactics are derived 
from an analysis of AF documentation.  
The first advocacy tactic used by the AF relates to increasing brand awareness and, to a greater 
extent, issue awareness by presenting symbols that cause increased awareness and understanding. 
Such symbols could be the organization’s name and logo, but also actions or people that symbolize the 
brand or an HIV-related issue and serve as catalysts by causing a broader interpretation and 
understanding of HIV-related issues. The documentation shows evidence for this tactic when for 
instance local people with HIV serve as symbols of certain problems, which is for instance done by 
presenting the personal story of the Ukrainian sex worker Natalia and the problems she faces (Aids 
Fund 2014a, 13). This research refers to this tactic as ‘symbolic power’ (based on Boström and 
Hallström 2010, 43-49; Keck and Sikkink 1999, 96-7). 
The second form of advocacy, which is referred to as ‘cognitive power’, involves the 
provision of new, unique and sometimes subjective information, again with the goal of raising issue 
awareness. AF documentation shows this tactic is used abundantly. Additionally, it suggests that 
information must be presented with the context of the receiver in mind. The reason is that “[...] 
communities play a critical role in addressing the social and structural factors [...]” (Aids Fund 2014a, 
4) and therefore must receive fitting and usable information that they can pass on within civil 
societies. Furthermore, the AF not only provides factual and technical data, but also expertise to local 
and regional partners to enable them to spread their messages most effectively in their communities 
                                               
4 Such tactics could be seen as an extension of persuasion literature. Similarly to the conceptualization of persuasion (see 
footnote 2), this research notes that advocacy tactics as articulated by the AF do not per se go into norm advocacy, but 
advocacy in general.  
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(Aids Fund 2014a, 4-8). We consider these first two tactics as founded on constructivist perceptions, 
because both tactics encourage actors through issue awareness to take action based on the logic of 
appropriateness.  
The third and fourth tactics are considered realist-based, because they demonstrate the logic of 
consequences. The first realist-based tactic is ‘social power’. It addresses two things: a) the access to 
social networks through cooperation with others and b) the use of sanctions (or the threat thereof) 
against others. In the first case, the AF expands its power through organizational linkage and 
alliancing with other foundations, civil society organizations and governments. Naming partnerships 
within cooperation networks with organizations, such as the United Nations and the Global Fund to 
Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria is evidence of this tactic. Within BtG there is a focus on 
cooperation with third parties in order to strengthen its own advocacy capacity and therefore to ensure 
more action (Aids Fund 2014a, 3-10). In the second case, the foundation enhances its power position 
through leverage and sanctioning, for which also ample evidence can be found in AF documentation. 
The focus on power-maximization makes this tactic congruent with realism (see Boström and 
Hallström 2010, 45-7; Keck and Sikkink 1999, 97). 
The fourth and final tactic is ‘monitorial power’. It refers to the AF holding external actors 
accountable for their behavior or policies. There is less documentation of this tactics, but the AF does 
mention that its advocacy activities also serve to demand the inclusion of vulnerable populations and 
that BtG often serves as a watchdog to examine policies, which are indeed monitorial activities (Aids 
Fund 2014a, 5-8). This tactic emphasizes power (i.e. the power of NGOs to hold others accountable) 
and is therefore a realist-based tactic (see Boström and Hallström 2010, 47-9; Keck and Sikkink 1999, 
97-8). 
This set of constructivist-based and realist-based tactics is to a great extent compatible with 
theoretically developed advocacy typologies. The four denominations of the advocacy tactics – 
symbolic, cognitive, social and monitorial power – are derived from the typology of Boström and 
Hallström (2010). But although there are many parallels with the typology of Boström and Hallström, 
the typology in this research is richer. A comparison of both conceptualizations of symbolic power 
makes this clear: Boström and Hallström regard symbolic power as the use of “[...] the name and logo 
associated with a particular organization” (2010, 43) to raise awareness “[...] without visible actions 
being taken” (2010, 45), whereas this research goes one step further by including the symbolic role 
that actions or individual stories can play, as is also emphasized by Keck and Sikkink (1999, 96-7).
5
 A 
similar typological expansion occurs with social power: Boström and Hallström only take 
organizational cooperation into account (2010, 47), while this research adds the notion of leverage to 
the typology (based on Keck and Sikkink 1999, 97). As a result, the typology in this research finds its 
                                               
5 Additionally, different sets of theoretically developed advocacy tactics often overlap: this is evident when comparing the set 
of Boström and Hallström (2010) to the set of Keck and Sikkink (1999), and to a lesser extent when comparing either to the 
typology of Barnett and Duvall (2005).  
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origin in empirical investigation, but simultaneously fits theoretical conceptualizations of advocacy 
tactics.  
Finally, countless theories and different models for measuring NGO advocacy performance 
have been developed over the years (e.g. Boris and Mosher-Williams 1998; Kelly 2002; Paris and 
Kates 2003; Roche 2010). Some scholars have argued that methods based on a single indicator are not 
good measurement tools (Betsill and Corell 2001; Herman and Renz 1999, 110-3), but in truth very 
few scholars nor NGO practitioners agree on how to measure performance. Yet, as Keck and Sikkink 
have noted, the achievement of goals can provide strong performance indicators (1998, 25). Since this 
research employs a performance measurement method that includes such goal attainment, the validity 
of the measurement is assumed to be satisfactory. In the next section a detailed account on the 
performance measurement will be presented.  
  
3. The Influence of Advocacy Tactics on Performance    
i. Project Cases and Methodology 
Before the distribution of constructivist-based and realist-based advocacy tactics and NGO 
performance can be measured, the cases on which measurements will be performed must be addressed. 
This research will test project cases that are part of the AF’s BtG program. Bridging the Gaps is a 
multiannual program of the AF and partners with the mission to provide HIV/AIDS care (i.e. 
prevention, treatment and support) for three groups in society. These groups (or: key populations) are 
a) sex workers, b) men who have sex with men (MSM) or lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual 
people (LGBT) and c) people who use drugs (PUD). People within these groups are most likely to be 
infected with HIV/AIDS. Because of their vulnerability, BtG focuses its activities on those groups 
specifically, as to bring HIV/AIDS to a halt (Aids Fund 2013a, 2-3).  
Notably, the provision of services to key populations is linked to advocacy. The AF and 
partners believe that providing services can be optimized by stressing the human rights of key 
populations. Therefore, they use advocacy on a national level, in order to address criminalization of 
and discriminatory laws against key populations. Additionally, advocacy is also used on a local and 
regional level in communities, to lobby for the social acceptance of their human rights and to break 
stigma that impede effective service provision. To tackle both local and national issues, BtG has some 
specific goals in terms of advocacy: a) to offer relevant information to national and local governments, 
civil societies and international donors to increase awareness for the issues at stake, b) to improve 
international behavior and policies toward key populations, and c) to sustain behavior and policies 
once improvements occur (Aids Fund 2012, 1). 
The BtG program consists of numerous projects in sixteen countries, where the rights of key 
populations are violated and consequently advocacy is needed. For this research, project cases are 
selected from the BtG program. These are: 1) the MSM project in Kenya, 2) the PUD project in 
Kenya, 3) the MSM project in South-Africa and 4) the PUD project in South-Africa. In all four cases, 
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partner organizations contribute to the AF’s efforts and are involved in key parts of the projects, 
including implementation and evaluation. The partner organizations are: the Global Forum on MSM 
and HIV (MSMGF) for the MSM project in Kenya, COC Nederland (COC) for the MSM project in 
South-Africa, and Mainline for both PUD projects (Aids Fund 2013a, 2-8; Aids Fund 2014b, 1-2). 
Additionally, the AF and its partners operate differently in each project. The following case 
description scrutinizes the different characteristics of the cases.  
In Kenya, MSM are often criminalized, stigmatized and discriminated. Homosexuality is 
considered wrong in national and regional governmental institutions, government-related institutions 
such as the media, judiciaries and police, and as a result in large parts of Kenyan society. 
Consequently, the human rights of MSM are often violated and their access to HIV/AIDS health care 
is impeded. In cooperation with partner organizations this project addresses the discriminatory 
legislation nationally, but also aims to alter stigma locally, because the patriarchal character of local 
communities impedes positive changes towards MSM acceptance. Specifically, this project helped to 
establish an MSM taskforce in Kenya that seeks to inform politicians about MSM rights and supports 
individual advocacy actions. Furthermore, the project points its advocacy activities directly towards 
political institutions, law enforcement and media to improve MSM rights politically. In addition, the 
project helped develop the National AIDS and STI Control Programme, which led to increased 
accessibility to condoms in Kenya. Thus, by stressing MSM rights politically, the project seeks to 
improve MSM acceptance in Kenya and MSM access to HIV/AIDS health services (Aids Fund 2014c; 
Aids Fund 2014g, 22-3, 34, 43). 
The PUD project in Kenya similarly addresses the key population’s rights politically. The 
project’s activities involve the provision of health services and counseling to PUD in society. 
However, due to restrictive legislation the distribution of clean needles and syringes is illegal, despite 
that such distribution would diminish HIV/AIDS among PUD. To overcome this and other legislative 
issues (such as the punitive laws), the project advocates for the rights of PUD politically. Moreover, 
the project assisted in the formation of the Mombasa County Drugs Intervention Forum. This forum 
lobbies for the prevention of human right violations against PUD by law enforcement agencies. 
Additionally, in cooperation with the Reachout Centre Trust the project trained these agencies to 
improve their understanding of PUD. More generally, the project helps to strengthen the capacities of 
Kenyan organizations in order to advance the rights of PUD and to decrease the prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS among them (Aids Fund 2014e; Aids Fund 2014g, 25, 33). 
In contrast, the South-African projects focus more on communal and local services, given that 
for both key populations legislation is less restrictive and political intervention by the projects is 
therefore less needed. As a consequence, the MSM project focuses on resource mobilization to locals. 
The project provides services in communities: they provide condoms and sexual education to inform 
people about the risks of sexual behavior and to ensure that MSM seek the help of health care services 
when needed. Additionally, they give workshops to train peer educators to conduct educational 
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meetings (2014g, 27, 49). Although this project is also politically active, for instance to get the needs 
of MSM on the national agenda of the National AIDS Council and other government institutions (Aids 
Fund 2014d), the project’s activities generally aim to improve MSM rights and services socially.  
Similarly, the South-African PUD project focuses on the local support of PUD in society 
rather than on the political situation for PUD, because their rights are mainly violated socially. In 
contrast to Kenya, the distribution of clean needles and syringes in South-Africa is permitted, which 
decreases the sharing of needles and thus HIV/AIDS prevalence. However, drug use itself remains 
prohibited. Therefore, this project trains local teams of paralegals that assist PUD whenever they face 
trial. Furthermore, in cooperation with Health4Men the project locally educates PUD how to safely 
inject drugs in order to eliminate the risk of HIV/AIDS transmission. These services are established in 
Durban, Cape Town and Pretoria, because PUD mainly live in those cities. Additionally, harm 
reduction services provide tools to deal with local violence against PUD (Aids Fund 2014f).  
The study of those four projects paves the way for a two-by-two comparative analysis: first, 
this set of cases allows for a project comparison within countries, i.e. between projects in one country. 
By employing a most similar system design – what Mill would call a method of difference (1851) – 
project comparisons within countries will result in strong implications for the relation between certain 
tactics and project performance. As Mill put it: “[...] by the method of difference alone [...] we can 
ever, in the way of direct experience, arrive with certainty at causes” (1851, 401). Indeed, differences 
in performance per case can then be ascribed to the dominance of certain tactics only, because other 
factors that could influence performance remain identical (Manheim et al. 2012, 219; Mill 1851, 393-
401; Seawright and Gerring 2008, 304-6). Second, this set of cases allows for a comparison between 
both countries. Such a comparison is relevant, because it can reveal a possible intervening role for a 
country’s regime type (i.e. the level of democracy): it could be argued that in different regimes (i.e. 
South-Africa is more democratic than Kenya
6
) different tactics are required for high performance. 
More specifically, the case description shows that in the Kenyan projects the emphasis lies on 
advocating for the human rights of key populations politically, which possibly could result in a 
dominance of realist-based advocacy tactics in the country. Similarly, the emphasis in the projects in 
South-Africa lies on reaching communities rather than directly influencing governments. Project 
partners inform people by going locally and primarily focus on issue raising. This could indicate a 
dominance of constructivist-based tactics in South-Africa.  
Besides the methodological advantages, there are also downsides in using this method. This 
research’s limitation is the level of generalizability: due to the small number of cases generalizability 
of results is impeded, because it is unclear whether these four selected cases are representative for all 
                                               
6 I.e. a score of 9 for South-Africa compared to a score of -2 for Kenya on a scale ranging from -10 (autocratic) to 10 
(democratic) (NationMaster 2015). See also democracy scores by Freedom House: on a scale ranging from 7 (not free) to 1 
(free), South-Africa is scored a 2 (free) and Kenya a 4 (partly free) (Freedom House 2015). However, one should note that 
levels are calculated estimates rather than ‘set’ scores, given that ‘democracy’ is a multi-interpretable concept and therefore a 
precision problem occurs when ascribing such levels to countries. 
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projects. Nevertheless, this research can be fruitful, particularly as exploratory research (Seawright and 
Gerring 2008, 298).  
In order to generate results on the four cases, a twofold investigation is needed. First, the 
distribution of constructivist-based and realist-based advocacy tactics in each case must be measured. 
Second, the level of performance of each case must be pinpointed. That would pave the way for a 
comparison of the two parts, and would thus provide evidence for a causal relationship.  
To measure the dominance of advocacy tactics based on constructivist or realist perceptions, 
project documentation will be analyzed via content analyses. In total, 23 content analyses will be done 
on those documents, which include evaluations and reports. To measure the distribution of tactics, a 
codebook is developed. As Babbie already noted, “[c]ontent analysis is essentially a coding operation. 
[It] is the process of transforming raw data into a standardized form” (2010, 338). This research 
operationalizes advocacy tactics via the codebook presented in Appendix 1, which allows for a clear 
distinction between the different constructivist-based and realist-based advocacy tactics. The 
measurements in the content analyses will be done on a sentence-level, because that allows for a 
detailed analysis; only then the validity will be upheld. Larger levels of analysis, such as a paragraph-
level, simply do not allow for measurements that are accurate enough. It should however be noted that 
sometimes even from one sentence two different tactics can be extracted. Indeed, Boström and 
Hallström argue as well that in many cases combinations of advocacy tactics are utilized (2010, 43-9), 
which occurs when tactics with the same theoretical ground (i.e. symbolic and cognitive power; or 
social and monitorial power) are combined, but also when advocacy tactics that hold conflicting 
theoretical connotations are combined (e.g. cognitive and social power). Therefore, when 
combinations occur this research will use double coding, in order to preserve accuracy. These tactic 
combinations will be put in a separate category and add another dimension to the analysis. The results 
section will show how advocacy tactics and combinations of tactics are distributed in the projects. 
Subsequently, performance is measured via a single-measurement goal attainment method. 
The goal of the BtG program is to decrease the number of new HIV/AIDS infections and therefore this 
research measures performance in relation to change in the number of new HIV/AIDS infections. This 
measurement is not dichotomous; it is not either ‘high’ or ‘low’ but instead is placed on a performance 
scale, ranging from a ‘very high degree of performance’ to a ‘very low degree of performance’. To 
determine the degree of performance, this research compares each project’s goal (in terms of targeted 
decrease in the number of new HIV/AIDS infections) to the actual achieved number of people that 
have been reached per project. These numbers will be derived from mid-term project evaluation 
reports from BtG. 
One should note that the measurement of performance relies on just one indicator rather than 
multiple, which carries the risk of oversimplification. Nevertheless, the results of this research’s 
performance measurement pave the way for a comparison with the distribution of advocacy tactics, in 
order to answer the research question and to gain insights in the correlation between the use of certain 
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tactics and the degree of performance. Additionally, as stated earlier, in this light this research will 
also explore the influence of regime type on the relation between tactics and performance. To test how 
regime type is intervening, a semi-structured interview is conducted with the program director of BtG 
(Appendix 3).  
 
ii. Results: the Distribution of Tactics and the Degree of Performance 
Table 1 presents the results of the content analyses. Accordingly, it shows how the four 
different advocacy tactics are distributed among the four projects (i, ii, iii, iv), as well as how they are 
distributed in total (v). The latter part (v) indicates that the most used advocacy tactic is cognitive 
power (50.62%), followed by social power (25.51%). The tactic that is least used by the AF is 
monitorial power (6.99%), followed by symbolic power (16.87%). The distribution of advocacy tactics 
is significant; the chi-square test reveals that the level of significance is high enough the exclude the 
chance of coincidence in distribution variation (i.e. <0.001). Additionally, what stands out in part v is 
the distribution of separate (i.e. uncombined) versus combined tactics. Both symbolic power and 
cognitive power are most frequently used by the AF separately (60.16% and 63.96%, respectively). Yet, 
this is not the case for social and monitorial power. Although both tactics occur uncombined (37.63% and 
29.41%, respectively), they are most often used when linked to other tactics: social power most often 
occurs in combination with cognitive power (46.24%), while monitorial power is mostly linked to cognitive 
and social power (29.41% and 33.33%, respectively). In other words, these results indicate that when the 
AF uses social or monitorial power, it frequently accompanies its message with cognitive power, i.e. 
arguments, statements, or factual information. On the other hand, symbolic and cognitive power go less 
frequently combined with another tactic.  
Part i, ii, iii and iv contain the distribution of advocacy tactics per project case. In relation to part v, 
part i and ii show that in Kenya tactics are distributed differently. There, symbolic and cognitive power 
occur less than in part v (5.00% and 12.41% versus 16.87% for symbolic; 37.00% and 42.48% versus 
50.62% for cognitive power), while social and monitorial power on the other hand occur more frequently in 
Kenya (45.00% and 33.08% versus 25.51% for social; 13.00% and 12.03% versus 6.99% for monitorial 
power). Subsequently, part iii and iv, containing the analyses of the South-African projects, show a greater 
emphasis on symbolic and cognitive power rather than on social and monitorial power. Compared to part v, 
the use of symbolic power is respectively 2.77% and 12.63% higher for the projects in South-Africa and 
cognitive power is more frequently in these projects, too (8.31% and 11.97%, respectively). On the other 
hand, the use of social and monitorial power in South-Africa is lower than in part v (for social power a 
decrease of 4.97% and 20.47%; for monitorial power a decrease of 6.10% and 4.11%). Thus, what stands 
out is that significant variation in tactic distribution occurs between countries, rather than within countries: 
different distributions of tactics occur between the Kenyan projects on one hand and South-African projects 
on the other (i.e. when comparing part i and ii to part iii and iv), while within both countries the 
distributions are more similar (i.e. when comparing i to ii, and iii to iv). Additionally, the distribution of 
tactics is significant in each of these parts.  
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Table 1. Distribution matrix of the four advocacy tactics per selected project case of the BtG program 
(i) Result of the content analysis on the MSM project in Kenya in % (n):
7
 
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total* 
Symbolic Power 80.00 (4) - 2.22 (1) - 5.00 (5) 
Cognitive Power - 45.95 (17) 40.00 (18) 15.38 (2) 37.00 (37) 
Social Power 20.00 (1) 48.65 (18) 42.22 (19) 53.85 (7) 45.00 (45) 
Monitorial Power - 5.41 (2) 15.56 (7) 30.77 (4) 13.00 (13) 
Total 100.00 (5) 100.01 (37) 100.00 (45) 100.00 (13) 100.00 (100) 
*significance: χ2 = 43.52. 43.52 > 16.266 (critical value for 3 degrees of freedom), so distribution is significant (<0.001)8 
(ii) Result of the content analysis on the PUD project in Kenya in % (n): 
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total* 
Symbolic Power 54.55 (18) 5.31 (6) 6.82 (6) 9.38 (3) 12.41 (33) 
Cognitive Power 18.18 (6) 46.90 (53) 47.73 (42) 37.50 (12) 42.48 (113) 
Social Power 18.18 (6) 37.17 (42) 35.23 (31) 28.13 (9) 33.08 (88) 
Monitorial Power 9.09 (3) 10.62 (12) 10.23 (9) 25.00 (8) 12.03 (32) 
Total 100.00 (33) 100.00 (113) 100.01 (88) 100.01 (32) 100.00 (266) 
*significance: χ2 = 74.25. 74.25 > 16.266 (critical value for 3 degrees of freedom), so distribution is significant (<0.001) 
(iii) Result of the content analysis on the MSM project in South-Africa in % (n): 
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total* 
Symbolic Power 52.27 (23) 11.36 (15) 13.04 (6) - 19.64 (44) 
Cognitive Power 34.09 (15) 70.45 (93) 50.00 (23) 50.00 (1) 58.93 (132) 
Social Power 13.64 (6) 17.42 (23) 34.78 (16) 50.00 (1) 20.54 (46) 
Monitorial Power - 0.76 (1) 2.17 (1) - 0.89 (2) 
Total 100.00 (44) 99.99 (132) 99.99 (46) 100.00 (2) 100.00 (224) 
*significance: χ2 = 159.57. 159.57 > 16.266 (critical value for 3 degrees of freedom), so distribution is significant (<0.001) 
(iv) Result of the content analysis on the PUD project in South-Africa in % (n): 
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total* 
Symbolic Power 70.73 (29) 12.64 (11) - 25.00 (1) 29.50 (41) 
Cognitive Power 26.83 (11) 83.91 (73) 42.86 (3) - 62.59 (87) 
Social Power - 3.45 (3) 57.14 (4) - 5.04 (7) 
Monitorial Power 2.44 (1) - - 75.00 (3) 2.88 (4) 
Total 100.00 (41) 100.00 (87) 100.00 (7) 100.00 (4) 100.01 (139) 
*significance: χ2 = 129.05. 129.05 > 16.266 (critical value for 3 degrees of freedom), so distribution is significant (<0.001) 
(v) Total result of all four content analyses combined in % (n): 
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total* 
Symbolic Power 60.16 (74) 8.67 (32) 6.99 (13) 7.84 (4) 16.87 (123) 
Cognitive Power 26.02 (32) 63.96 (236) 46.24 (86) 29.41 (15) 50.62 (369) 
Social Power 10.57 (13) 23.31 (86) 37.63 (70) 33.33 (17) 25.51 (186) 
Monitorial Power 3.25 (4) 4.07 (15) 9.14 (17) 29.41 (15) 6.99 (51) 
Total 100.00 (123) 100.01 (369) 100.00 (186) 99.99 (51) 99.99 (729) 
*significance: χ2 = 305.22. 305.22 > 16.266 (critical value for 3 degrees of freedom), so distribution is significant (<0.001) 
 
A translation of these four advocacy tactics to tactics founded on either constructivist or realist 
views can be found in Table 2. As part v demonstrates, tactics that are based on notions of constructivism 
are used more frequently than realist-based tactics (respectively, 67.49% and 32.51%). The chi-square test 
proves that this distribution is significant and does not rest on random variation. Subsequently, what stands 
out is the distribution of combined tactics for the two sets. While constructivist-based tactics normally 
occur without being combined to realist-based tactics (76.02%), realist-based tactics on the other hand just 
as regularly occur separately as linked with constructivist-based tactics instead (50.21% and 49.79%). 
Although it is unclear why this is the case, these results suggest that constructivist-based tactics have the 
ability to strengthen – or at least support – realist-based tactics.  
Furthermore, resembling the results of Table 1, this table shows that within the two countries the 
distributions are quite similar, in contrast to the distributions between the two countries. Compared to the 
                                               
7 For an overview per analysis of all matrices, see appendix 2. 
8 For the critical values for chi-square distributions (and their degrees of freedom), see Argyrous 2011, 545: Table A4.  
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combined results of part v, the projects of South-Africa (part iii and iv) show a significant increase in the 
usage of constructivist-based tactics (for the PUD project even up to 92.09%) and a significant decrease in 
the usage of realist-based tactics. Among the Kenyan projects on the other hand both types of tactics are 
distributed more equally. In the case of the PUD project realist-based tactics are used 58.00% of the time, 
whereas in the MSM project constructivist-based tactics are used more (54.89%). However, as the chi-
square tests of i and ii illustrate, random distribution cannot be excluded here (>0.05). Consequently, we 
have to assume that the constructivist-based and realist-based tactics in Kenya are distributed equally 
among its projects. In subsection 3.iii, the implications of the results of Table 1 and 2 will be presented. 
The final measurement is concerned with the performance of the four project cases. It compares the 
set target to the mid-term results to determine the degree of performance. Before the results are explicated, 
it should be noted that mid-term results have been selected rather than final results. This was done because 
final results are unavailable at this moment, as the BtG program does not finish before the end of 2015. 
 Evidently, the presented mid-term results in Table 3 are lower than the final results will be. 
Although this is not problematic for the relative scores of the projects vis-á-vis (since these remain 
identical), this does pose a problem for the absolute performance scores of the projects. To overcome the 
issue of comparing long-term goals to mid-term results, scores for performance are ascribed with the 
dissimilarity between the mid-term and final results in mind. This is especially relevant given that it is 
                                               
9 Based on Table 1: the first set of tactics is constructivist-based and consists of both symbolic and cognitive power. The 
second set of tactics is realist-based and is the sum of social and monitorial power.  
Table 2. Distribution matrix of the two constructivist-based and realist-based sets of advocacy tactics per selected project 
case of the BtG program
9
 
(i) Result of the content analysis on the MSM project in Kenya in % (n): 
 Constructivist-based tactics Realist-based tactics Total* 
Constructivist-based tactics 50.00 (21) 36.21 (21) 42.00 (42) 
Realist-based tactics 50.00 (21) 63.79 (37) 58.00 (58) 
Total 100.00 (42) 100.00 (58) 100.00 (100) 
*significance: χ2 = 2.56. 2.56 < 3.841 (critical value for 1 degree of freedom), so distribution is not significant (>0.05) 
(ii) Result of the content analysis on the PUD project in Kenya in % (n): 
 Constructivist-based tactics Realist-based tactics Total* 
Constructivist-based tactics  56.85 (83) 52.50 (63) 54.89 (146) 
Realist-based tactics 43.15 (63) 47.50 (57) 45.11 (120) 
Total 100.00 (146) 100.00 (120) 100.00 (266) 
*significance: χ2 = 2.54. 2.54 > 3.841 (critical value for 1 degree of freedom), so distribution is not significant (>0.05) 
(iii) Result of the content analysis on the MSM project in South-Africa in % (n): 
 Constructivist-based tactics Realist-based tactics Total* 
Constructivist-based tactics 82.95 (146) 62.50 (30) 78.57 (176) 
Realist-based tactics 17.05 (30) 37.50 (18) 21.43 (48) 
Total 100.00 (176) 100.00 (48) 100.00 (224) 
*significance: χ2 = 73.14. 73.14 > 10.828 (critical value for 1 degree of freedom), so distribution is significant (<0.001) 
(iv) Result of the content analysis on the PUD project in South-Africa in % (n): 
 Constructivist-based tactics Realist-based tactics Total* 
Constructivist-based tactics 96.88 (124) 36.36 (4) 92.09 (128) 
Realist-based tactics 3.13 (4) 63.64 (7) 7.91 (11) 
Total 100.01 (128) 100.00 (11) 100.00 (139) 
*significance: χ2 = 98.48. 98.48 > 10.828 (critical value for 1 degree of freedom), so distribution is significant (<0.001) 
(v) Total results of all four content analyses combined in % (n): 
 Constructivist-based tactics Realist-based tactics Total* 
Constructivist-based tactics 76.02 (374) 49.79 (118) 67.49 (492) 
Realist-based tactics 23.98 (118) 50.21 (119) 32.51 (237) 
Total 100.00 (492) 100.00 (237) 100.00 (729) 
*significance: χ2 = 89.20. 89.20 > 10.828 (critical value for 1 degree of freedom), so distribution is significant (<0.001) 
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generally assumed that most projects become increasingly effective over time. Thus, the degrees of 
performance as presented in Table 3 will turn out higher than the mid-term goal attainment scores would 
suggest.  
That being said, Table 3 demonstrates that the MSM project in South-Africa (iii) was the most 
effective project. Within the first sixteen months of the project the five-year goal was already achieved and 
even exceeded (i.e. a goal attainment of 108.82%). Therefore, this project was scored a ‘very high degree 
of performance’. In fact, this means that in South-Africa the MSM project’s community-focused approach 
to provide services and education on a local level can be regarded as very successful. Ranking second, the 
PUD project in Kenya (ii) scored high: in sixteen months, it attained 25.06% of its target. However, it 
should be stated that the set target of reaching 3990 people was much lower than in the other cases; goals in 
other cases were at least five times higher. It is unclear why this goal is set lower, but this may done based 
on the AF’s expectation that the project’s access to local PUD was restrained by Kenya’s punitive laws 
with regards to these people. Nonetheless the PUD project in Kenya reached many PUD in the first sixteen 
months and therefore scored a ‘high degree of performance’.   
              Lower degrees in performance were attained by the MSM project in Kenya (i) and the PUD 
project in South-Africa (iv). The Kenyan MSM project scored a ‘medium-to-low degree of performance’ 
with an attained target of 4.66% in the first sixteen months. Even though this attained target suggests a low 
rather than medium-to-low degree, one has to take into consideration that these are the results of the first 
months only and most projects become exponentially effective over time. Nevertheless, the score of this 
project is relatively lower than in the first two projects, which could have been caused by numerous 
variables, including the Kenyan punitive laws that makes it harder to reach MSM. Yet, whatever the reason 
may be, the score of the Kenyan MSM project is not as low as the score of the PUD project in South-
Africa. This project started years later than the other three; yet, a goal was set at the extremely high number 
                                               
10 The results in this table refer to AF’s goal that is coded as ‘1C’, i.e. ‘the number of clients reached with services that match 
their needs’. Data derived from Aids Fund 2013b; Aids Fund 2013c; Aids Fund 2015.  
11 As stated, an official number for the sixteen months of the project is missing here. A score for this period can be calculated 
based on the outcome for the first year of the project. This one-year outcome is 500. Therefore, the expected goal attainment 
for sixteen months is: 500 / 12 (total months) = 41.67 per month; 41.67 x 16 = 625.  
Table 3. Performance measurement per case, based on the single goal attainment indicator of decreasing the number of new 
HIV/AIDS infections  
 5 year program 
goal: 
targeted decrease in 
the number of new 
HIV/AIDS 
infections in n
10
 
mid-term results 
(16 months): 
number of people 
reached during the 
time of the project in 
n 
target attained: 
project performance 
in % 
project score: 
compared to the 
other selected project 
cases 
(i) MSM project in Kenya 21500 1002 4.66% 
Medium-low degree 
of performance 
(ii) PUD project in Kenya 3990 1000 25.06% 
High degree of 
performance 
(iii) MSM project in South-
Africa 
70000 76177 108.82% 
Very high degree of 
performance 
(iv) PUD project in South-Africa 165460 
N/A 
estimated: 625
11
 
N/A 
estimated: 0.38% 
N/A 
Low degree of 
performance 
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of 165460. However, the AF does not have this project’s mid-term results and therefore a reliable number 
of the degree of performance is hard to obtain. However, based on the number reached in the first year (i.e. 
twelve months) of this project, it can be estimated that at the time of the mid-term results only 625 people – 
less than 1% of the target – will be reached. Without speculating why there is such a gap between the 
targeted and estimated number of people reached, the South-African PUD project is scored a low degree of 
performance. However, the validity of this number can be questioned given its use of expected rather than 
actual data.   
 
iii. Results: Comparing Tactic Distribution and Performance 
As the results in Table 4C illustrate, a comparison of the results does not directly provide a 
clear answer to the research question, due to great variation in the performance of cases. Yet, when 
distinguishing these cases per type of project (i.e. PUD and MSM), as is done in Table 4A and 4B, 
clear implications for each project type are provided. For PUD projects, we see that a) project 
performance is higher when the used tactics are both constructivist-based and realist-based and b) 
project performance is lower when predominantly constructivist-based tactics are used. As a result, for 
PUD projects the evidence suggests that hypothesis 3 can be assumed and hypothesis 1 can be 
refuted.
12
 The causal direction for the other project type is reverse. The MSM projects show that a) 
project performance is higher when the used tactics are predominantly constructivist-based and b) 
performance is lower when a combination of tactics is used. Consequently, for MSM projects there is 
evidence implying the salience of constructivism, i.e. it suggests that hypothesis 1 can be assumed and 
hypothesis 3 can be refuted for this project type.  
The differentiation in the causal directions is reflected by the chosen advocacy approach in 
each project. Since the performance of MSM projects increases when constructivist-based tactics are 
predominant, as the results indicate, this should be reflected in the advocacy approaches in MSM 
projects, which is indeed the case. In the South-African project we see a lot of advocacy activities that 
are linked to constructivist-based tactics: as the aforementioned case description has put forward 
already, the activities focus on services for communities with the goal of informing and raising issue 
awareness, including sexual education to locals, the training of peer educators through workshops and 
resource mobilization, such as the provision of condoms (Aids Fund 2014d).
13
 These activities are 
congruent to the constructivist logic, as articulated earlier as well, and thus they confirm the 
implication that indeed constructivist-oriented approaches result in high project performance for MSM 
projects. On the other hand, in the Kenyan MSM project the approach is partly in line with realist 
notions: besides similar community-focused services that match with constructivist ideas, the approach 
also contains power-related (i.e. realist) elements. For instance, this project also influences and 
pressures political actors both nationally and regionally toward equal rights for MSM, by holding them 
                                               
12 Given that in neither the PUD project nor in the MSM project realist-based tactics were dominant, hypothesis 2 is 
disregarded in this context.  
13 In this sense, providing condoms has also value symbolically.  
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accountable and by employing realist-based tactics that involve shaming, leveraging and sanctioning 
(Aids Fund 2014c). Since this project’s performance score is low, it is implied that these realist-based 
tactics negatively affect the performance of the Kenyan project and therefore also reflect the idea that 
the predominance of constructivist-based tactics in MSM projects leads to higher performance.  
 Similarly, the activities of the PUD projects echo the implication of this project type, i.e. that 
an equal distribution of constructivist-based and realist-based tactics leads to higher performance than 
when constructivist-based tactics are dominant. In the case of the South-African PUD project mainly 
constructivist-based tactics are used, which confirms the causal relation for PUD projects, given the 
project’s low level of project performance. For instance, constructivist-based tactics are expressed 
through the provision of health care services in combination with educational packages on how to 
safely use drugs, with the aim of raising issue awareness socially. On the other hand are realist-based 
and power-related tactics rarely employed, given that the political debate with political actors about 
the rights of PUD in South-Africa is not conducted by the project (Aids Fund 2014f). Conversely, the 
PUD project in Kenya does employ those realist-based tactics: besides the usage of constructivist-
Table 4. Result comparison per type of project (A and B) and all combined (C): the distribution of tactics (Table 2) 
and the degree of performance (Table 3) compared 
A: result comparison for PUD projects 
D
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e 
o
f 
p
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n
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Very high    
High  XPUD Kenya  
Medium-high    
Medium    
Medium-low    
Low   XPUD S-Africa 
Very Low    
  Predominance of realist-
based tactics 
Combination of both 
constructivist-based and 
realist-based tactics  
Predominance of 
constructivist-based tactics 
  Theoretical notions within used tactics 
B: result comparison for MSM projects 
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Very high   XMSM S-Africa 
High    
Medium-high    
Medium    
Medium-low  XMSM Kenya  
Low    
Very Low    
  Predominance of realist-
based tactics 
Combination of both 
constructivist-based and 
realist-based tactics 
Predominance of 
constructivist-based tactics 
  Theoretical notions within used tactics 
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  Theoretical notions within used tactics 
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based tactics (e.g. education on safely using drugs), it employs tactics and activities that are in line 
with realist notions. For instance, the project is heavily involved with addressing the need of clean 
needles provision. As there are many restrictive laws for PUD in Kenya, such provision is forbidden 
(Aids Fund 2014e) and by employing power-related tactics the project aims to influence government 
institutions and their policies. Considering that this project has a higher level of performance than the 
South-African PUD project, it is implied that this is caused by the utilization of realist-based tactics in 
Kenya and the lack thereof in the South-African PUD project. Both cases therefore reflect the 
implication that for this project type performance increases when both type of tactics are distributed 
equally. 
However, considering that the causal direction for either type of project is indeed reflected by 
the activities within those projects, the question remains why both project types require different 
tactics. One could argue that the different requirements are influenced by the different needs of MSM 
and PUD populations, based on the fact that the existing barricades for PUD are socially and 
politically, whereas MSM are mainly in need of social change. For PUD, this point is illustrated by the 
South-African PUD project. This project focuses only on the social aspects within communities but 
does not address political barricades. Consequently, for instance discriminatory laws against PUD 
remain intact in South-Africa (Aids Fund 2014f). This is problematic for PUD, because this restrains 
the impact of the project socially, due to the limitations that restrictive legislation poses. Thus, by 
disregarding political factors, this case does not fully match the needs of PUD and as a result it has 
low performance. Given that the PUD project in Kenya on the other hand does match these political 
needs (Aids Fund 2014e) and has greater performance as well, it underscores the line of thought that 
the needs of PUD are both socially and politically.   
Similarly, the MSM projects demonstrate that MSM have mainly social needs, because they 
face particularly social issues: both in Kenyan and in South-African society stigmatization and 
discrimination are the biggest barricades for MSM, whereas legislation in both countries toward MSM 
has already positively developed over the years. The MSM project in South-Africa illustrates this: the 
project addresses the needs of MSM socially (i.e. by providing condoms, sexual education and 
trainings on a community level) and, given the fact that performance is high, it implies that this is the 
result of an approach that matches the needs of MSM (Aids Fund 2014d). In the case of the Kenyan 
MSM project we see however that the approach is also political. Advocacy on a political level is often 
employed, for instance to address the criminalization of homosexuality. Yet, as documentation states 
as well, over the years improvements have already been made politically: the criminalization has 
reached the agendas of political actors. Additionally, alliances and government institutions, such as the 
National Aids Control Council and the National Aids and STI Control Programme, have been 
established that have been successful in advocating the political rights of MSM (Aids Fund 2014c). 
Given the lower performance of this project, one could assume that a political approach has become 
less needed and that MSM projects instead require the consideration of social barricades and needs 
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only. So, a comparison of PUD and MSM projects indicates that there is a causal relation between 
tactics and performance per project type. Furthermore, this differentiation can be explained by the fact 
that both key populations require different tactics, because they have different needs based on the 
(either social or political) challenges they face.  
However, based on a comparison of the interview and the results of Table 2 this research in 
addition demonstrates that regime type is intervening in the causal relation between tactics and 
performance. As stipulated before, Table 2 illustrates that in the projects of democratic South-Africa 
constructivist-based tactics are dominant, whereas both constructivist-based and realist-based are 
distributed equally among projects in the more autocratic Kenya. The significant differences in tactic 
distribution between both countries suggest that this distribution is influenced by the regime type of a 
country, i.e. that the more democratic a country is, the more constructivist-based tactics are used and 
vice versa. The interview with Vermeulen, the program director of BtG, made clear that indeed 
advocacy tactics are based on the regime type of a country: “[...] if you are doing advocacy you want 
to change policy. Therefore, you want to look at where an entry point is and the kind of system that is 
in place changes where you can find those entry points” (Vermeulen 2015).14 Thus, the interview 
confirms that regime type influences what tactics are used within BtG. Furthermore, Vermeulen notes 
that the program purposefully chooses advocacy tactics based on regime type. In order to increase 
project performance one has to consider “[...]the context [projects] are in” (2015) and regime type is 
an essential part of that. The fact that the program purposefully determines its tactics based on regime 
type to ensure high performance, affirms that regime type not only influences the kind of tactics that 
are used, but also is intervening in the causal relation between tactics and performance for the four 
projects. This adds another dimension to the answer of the research question. 
In addition, Vermeulen demonstrates how regime type is intervening in this relation. “[…] [I]n 
Kenya what we do [...] is mostly changing the laws, while in South-Africa we are in the situation that 
the law is perhaps protective but then the implementation of the law is [focused on instead]” 
(Vermeulen 2015). In the case of the Kenyan approach this results in advocacy targeted at political 
actors, whereas it results in advocacy toward civil society in democratic South-Africa, he notes 
(Vermeulen 2015). This suggests that regime type influences the approach in a country and 
consequently the target of the projects, as Vermeulen affirms as well. This paves the way for 
explaining how regime type is intervening: regime type is intervening in the causal relation by 
influencing the approach to a country and as a result the tactics that correspond to these approaches. 
To explain this, one should consider the different approaches and their relation to certain 
tactics, as has been articulated earlier. When projects target civil societies, they mainly aim to inform 
and to raise issue awareness, because this could lead to social acceptance of the rights of key 
populations on a regional level. To influence social perceptions, they provide educational packages 
                                               
14 See appendix 3 for all the questions and answers in the interview.  
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and other services.
15
 These activities correspond to constructivist-based tactics, since these have 
similar aims: constructivist-based tactics aim for the appropriate action and, evidently, so does this 
approach. On the other hand, when targeting political actors the aim is to raise awareness among them, 
but also to influence their policies and political behavior. At this level, the establishment rather than 
the implementation of the policy is focused on. To accomplish this establishment, the project employs 
more leveraging, shaming and accountability activities. Since these are power-related actions, they 
match with realist-based tactics. So, both the social and the political approach illustrate that they are 
linked to specific types of tactics. Because the approach is bound to regime type, tactics are indirectly 
also influenced by regime type: in more democratic countries more constructivist-based tactics will be 
used and in less democratic countries relatively more realist-based tactics will be used, as the results of 
Table 2 confirm as well. 
Additionally, the intervening role for regime type can be expanded when considering that the 
program purposefully takes regime type into account because that would increase performance: it 
suggests that in democracies constructivist-based tactics lead to more performance and that in less 
democratic countries a combination of constructivist-based and realist-based tactics lead to more 
performance. Although this may be in line with the perception within BtG, the results of Table 4C 
instead show great performance variation within regime types, despite the use of tactics that should 
lead to high performance. For instance, in the Kenyan MSM project a combination of constructivist-
based and realist-based tactics were used, but nevertheless the performance was low. Similarly, in the 
South-African PUD project the use of constructivist-based tactics should have led to high 
performance, but performance was low instead. Therefore, due to great performance variation between 
the projects, it is indicated that considerations of regime type do not lead to high performance. This 
finding contradicts the perception within BtG and suggests that ascribing an intervening role for 
regime type is ill-founded.  
Rather, this research suggests that project type should be used as an intervening variable, as 
the result suggest, because the earlier explanation on project type showed that only then the specific 
needs of key populations are taken into account, which would increase performance. For instance, it 
could be assumed that the performance of the Kenyan MSM project would increase when mainly their 
social needs would have been taken into consideration: at the moment realist-based tactics are 
employed on a political level (based on regime type), but performance is low, because the notion that 
MSM require an approach that involves constructivist-based tactics is not taken into account. This 
assumption is enhanced by the notion that in projects where the used tactics are congruent to project 
type (i.e. in the South-African MSM project and the Kenyan PUD project) performance is much 
higher instead.
16
 This suggests that it is important to take these needs into consideration if one aims to 
increase performance. This adds a prescriptive dimension to the research question and could be 
                                               
15 For more examples of activities, see the case description. 
16 For an extensive case-by-case explanation of these implications and how different needs intervene in the causal relation, 
see the beginning of this subsection.  
23 
 
considered as policy advice for BtG as well. At the same time, it explains why regime type does not 
lead to high performance: it disregards the specific needs of key populations. 
 
4. Conclusion           
To recapitulate, this research investigates to what extent NGO performance is influenced by 
advocacy tactics. This question was answered per project type: for MSM projects constructivist-based 
tactics lead to high performance and therefore provided support for the salience of constructivism. 
Contrary, for PUD projects more equally distributed types of tactics appear effective and therefore 
provided support for both theories. Yet, because no project showed a dominance of realist-based 
tactics, it remains unclear how a predominance of realist-based tactics influences performance. 
Furthermore, BtG purposefully influences tactics based on regime type with the aim of increasing 
performance and thus regime type is intervening in the causal relation. Although this research also 
demonstrates an intervening role for regime type, it additionally argues, in contrast to the AF, that a 
consideration of regime type does not lead to increased performance, as the results show great 
performance variation within regime types. In contrast to the notions of the AF, the results indicate 
that rather project type should serve as an intervening variable, because then the needs of key 
populations are taken into account and consequently performance increases. 
The findings of this research are fruitful, both for the study of metatheories in IR and 
performance optimization by NGOs, specifically the AF. Additionally, future research can build upon 
this exploratory research. To further investigate the causal relation between performance and tactics 
that are founded on theoretical views, the study of more project cases is needed. Not only would this 
provide the strongest implications for causal relations; it would also allow for a comparison between 
projects of different programs and organizations, which would make the implications applicable to 
other organizations as well. This could offer new and interesting findings. Furthermore, future 
research could amplify this research’s notions on how regime type influences the causal relation and 
why project type should influence this relation. For instance, the relation between regime type and 
tactics could be further explored to investigate theoretical salience. Yet, it is up to future research to 
build on the findings of this research.  
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Appendix 1: codebook          
 
Codebook for advocacy tactics as used in the Bridging the Gaps Program of Aids Fund17 
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
iv
is
t 
T
ac
ti
cs
 
1) Symbolic power occurs when BtG documentation addresses: 
 the foundation’s (and its partners’) name, logo, reputation or legitimacy, including graphic descriptions, 
photographs and illustrations, with the aim to raise issue or brand awareness; 
 specific actions, events, stories or people that symbolize the brand or issue, including graphic descriptions, 
photographs and illustrations, with the aim to raise awareness;  
 graphic descriptions of HIV/AIDS as a disease, its symptoms, personal treatment and prevention, or the  
human rights of people living with HIV/AIDS, with the aim of raising issue awareness; or 
 the use of terms related to NGO legitimacy, such as ‘NGO’ itself, ‘ISO’, ‘expert-driven NGO’, etc., to 
symbolize “[...] collectively shared values” (Boström and Hallström 2010, 43). 
 
2) Cognitive power occurs when BtG documentation addresses: 
 the provision of “[...] unique knowledge and information” (Boström and Hallström 2010, 45) with the aim to 
inform and raise awareness, including ‘hard’, statistical or technical data; 
 personal, context-based and possibly subjective framing of information, e.g. normative, value-based 
statements or arguments and testimonies, with the aim of raising issue awareness; or 
 contextual considerations that are taken into account with the aim of optimizing awareness raising, such as 
the inclusion of language skills, cultural aspects and regional expertise. 
R
ea
li
st
 T
ac
ti
cs
 
3) Social power occurs when BtG documentation addresses: 
 the cooperation – formal or informal – with third parties, such as transnational alliances, other NGOs, or 
corporate businesses with the aim to enhance the ‘power position’ of the foundation; 
 the cooperation – formal or informal – within projects, such as stakeholders, local partners or civil society 
organizations with the aim to enhance the ‘power position’ of the foundation; 
 the attempts to establish cooperation through networking, leadership experience, and meetings (including 
seminars and workshops)18 with the aim to enhance the ‘power position’ of the foundation;  
 The use of sanctions, shaming or leverage with the aim to enhance the ‘power position’ of the foundation; or 
 The threat of the use of sanctions, shaming or leverage with the aim to enhance the ‘power position’ of the 
foundation. 
 
4) Monitorial power occurs when BtG documentation addresses: 
 demands or recommendations for improvements in behavior or policy by third parties, including those based 
on international agreements, with the aim to enhance the ‘power position’ of the foundation; 
 the foundation’s mentioning and broaching of neglected or failing action (including criticism) by third parties, 
despite their promises to alter their behavior or policy towards the eradication of HIV/AIDS, i.e. “[...] to 
expose the distance between rhetoric and practice” (Boström and Hallström 2010, 47), with the aim to 
enhance the ‘power network’ of the foundation;  
 positive or improving statement on behavior or policy by third parties, including the provision of positive 
statements such as compliments, with the aim to show the impact the foundation has already made (and thus 
reestablishing the ‘power position’ of the foundation); or 
 the foundation’s assessment and certification processes for evaluating third parties’ compliance and 
participation, including standard procedural evaluation bodies and criteria, with the aim to enhance the 
‘power position’ of the foundation. 
 
 
 
                                               
17 This codebook is mainly inspired by Boström and Hallström’s (2010, 43-9) typology of advocacy tactics and to a lesser 
extent by Keck and Sikkink’s typology (1999, 94-8). 
18 Because such attempts generally require the use of argumentation, this tactic often co-exists with cognitive power 
(Boström and Hallström 2010, 47). 
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Appendix 2: all content analyses, per project case     
 
i. Project on MSM in Kenya: 
Doc 1.: Aids Fund. 2014. LGBT Project Kenya. Derived from http://www.hivgaps.org/projects/lesbian-gay-bisexual-and-
transgender-projects/lgbt-project-kenya/. Visited on May 11, 2015.   
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power 2 - 1 - 3 
Cognitive Power - 5 2 - 7 
Social Power 1 2 3 1 7 
Monitorial Power - - 1 1 2 
Total 3 7 7 2 19 
 
Doc 2.: Aids Fund. 2013. Universal Access? Not without Rights!; Achievements of Bridging the Gaps; Health and Rights 
for Key Populations. 1-25. 
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power - - - - - 
Cognitive Power - 1 1 - 2 
Social Power - 1 1 - 2 
Monitorial Power - - - 3 3 
Total - 1 1 2 7 
 
Doc 3.: Aids Fund. 2014. Key Populations in the Driver’s Seat; On the Road to Universal Access to HIV Prevention, 
Treatment, Care, and Support. 1-33.    
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power 2 - - - 2 
Cognitive Power - 6 5 2 13 
Social Power - 5 7 4 16 
Monitorial Power - 2 4 - 6 
Total 2 13 16 6 37 
 
Doc 4.: Aids Fund. 2012. COC-MSMGF Implementation for the Bridging the Gaps LGBT Programme. 1-20. 
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power - - - - - 
Cognitive Power - 1 2 - 3 
Social Power - 2 1 - 3 
Monitorial Power - - - - - 
Total - 3 3 - 6 
 
Doc 5.: Aids Fund. 2013. Bridging the Gaps Activity Report Alliance Partners. 1-16.   
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power - - - - - 
Cognitive Power - 6 8 - 14 
Social Power - 8 7 2 17 
Monitorial Power - - 2 - 2 
Total - 14 17 2 33 
 
ii. Project on PUD in Kenya: 
Doc 1.: Aids Fund. 2014. PUD Project Kenya. Derived from http://www.hivgaps.org/projects/people-who-use-drugs-
projects/pud-project-kenya/. Visited on May 11, 2015.   
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power 1 1 - 1 3 
Cognitive Power 1 7 - 3 11 
Social Power - - 1 3 4 
Monitorial Power 1 3 3 - 7 
Total 3 11 4 7 25 
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Doc 2.: Aids Fund. 2013. Universal Access? Not without Rights!; Achievements of Bridging the Gaps; Health and Rights 
for Key Populations. 1-25. 
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power - - 1 - 1 
Cognitive Power - - 3 1 4 
Social Power 1 3 1 - 5 
Monitorial Power - 1 - - 1 
Total 1 4 5 1 11 
 
Doc 3.: Aids Fund. 2014. Key Populations in the Driver’s Seat; On the Road to Universal Access to HIV Prevention, 
Treatment, Care, and Support. 1-33.    
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power 4 1 - - 5 
Cognitive Power 1 2 3 - 6 
Social Power - 3 3 - 6 
Monitorial Power - - - 2 2 
Total 5 6 6 2 19 
  
Doc 4.: Aids Fund. 2013. Expanding Harm Reduction Knowledge in Kenya. Derived from 
http://www.hivgaps.org/news/expanding-harm-reduction-knowledge-in-kenya/. Visited on May 11, 2015.  
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power 3 - 2 - 5 
Cognitive Power - 8 6 - 14 
Social Power 2 6 4 - 12 
Monitorial Power - - - 1 1 
Total 5 13 12 1 32 
 
Doc 5.: Aids Fund. 2014. Protecting the Rights of People Who Use Drugs in Kenya. Derived from 
http://www.hivgaps.org/news/protecting-rights-people-use-drugs-kenya/. Visited on May 11, 2015.   
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power 1 - - - 1 
Cognitive Power - 3 3 2 8 
Social Power - 3 4 2 9 
Monitorial Power - 2 2 2 6 
Total 1 8 9 6 24 
 
Doc 6.: Aids Fund. 2013. Linking and Learning for a Better HIV Response for People Who Use Drugs in Kenya. Derived 
from http://www.hivgaps.org/news/linking-and-learning-for-a-better-hiv-response-for-people-who-use-drugs-in-kenya/   
Visited on May 11, 2015.   
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power 5 - - - 5 
Cognitive Power - 6 7 1 14 
Social Power - 7 5 - 12 
Monitorial Power - 1 - - 1 
Total 5 14 12 1 32 
 
Doc 7.: Aids Fund. 2014. Bridging the Gaps Narrative Annual Report. 1-19.   
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power 4 4 3 2 13 
Cognitive Power 4 27 20 5 56 
Social Power 3 20 13 4 40 
Monitorial Power 2 5 4 3 14 
Total 13 56 40 14 123 
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iii: Project on MSM in South-Africa: 
Doc 1.: Aids Fund. 2014. LGBT Project South Africa. Derived from http://www.hivgaps.org/projects/lesbian-gay-bisexual-
and-transgender-projects/lgbt-project-south-africa/. Visited on May 11, 2015.   
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power 1 1 2 - 4 
Cognitive Power 1 10 1 - 12 
Social Power 2 1 1 - 4 
Monitorial Power - - - - - 
Total 4 12 4 - 20 
 
Doc 2.: Aids Fund. 2014. We Are Bridging the Gaps; Being a Gay Man in a Multi-Cultural Society. 1-26. 
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power 6 5 2 - 13 
Cognitive Power 5 11 - - 16 
Social Power 2 - - - 2 
Monitorial Power - - - - - 
Total 13 16 2 - 31 
 
Doc 3.: Aids Fund. 2013. Universal Access? Not without Rights!; Achievements of Bridging the Gaps; Health and Rights 
for Key Populations. 1-25. 
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power 2 1 - - 3 
Cognitive Power 1 6 3 - 10 
Social Power - 3 - - 3 
Monitorial Power - - - - - 
Total 3 10 3 - 16 
 
Doc 4.: Aids Fund. 2014. Key Populations in the Driver’s Seat; On the Road to Universal Access to HIV Prevention, 
Treatment, Care, and Support. 1-33.    
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power 2 2 1 - 5 
Cognitive Power 2 10 - - 12 
Social Power 1 - 2 - 3 
Monitorial Power - - - - - 
Total 5 12 3 - 20 
 
Doc 5.: Aids Fund. 2014. Proud and Healthy: An Overview of Community Based Needs Assessments on Sexual Health of 
LGBTI’s in Southern Africa. 1-72. 
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power 12 5 - - 17 
Cognitive Power 5 40 2 - 47 
Social Power - 2 5 - 7 
Monitorial Power - - - - - 
Total 17 47 7 - 61 
  
Doc 6.: Aids Fund. 2012. COC-MSMGF Implementation for the Bridging the Gaps LGBT Programme. 1-20. 
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power - - - - - 
Cognitive Power - 1 2 - 3 
Social Power - 2 1 - 3 
Monitorial Power - - - - - 
Total - 3 3 - 6 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
Doc 7.: Aids Fund. 2013. Bridging the Gaps Activity Report Alliance Partners. 1-16.   
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power - 1 1 - 2 
Cognitive Power 1 13 14 1 29 
Social Power 1 14 6 1 22 
Monitorial Power - 1 1 - 2 
Total 2 29 22 2 55 
 
iv. Project on PUD in South-Africa: 
Doc 1.: Aids Fund. 2014. People Who Use Drugs Project South Africa. Derived from 
http://www.hivgaps.org/projects/people-who-use-drugs-projects/pud-project-south-africa/. Visited on May 11, 2015.   
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power 3 2 - 1 6 
Cognitive Power 2 4 - - 6 
Social Power - - 3 - 3 
Monitorial Power 1 - - - 1 
Total 6 6 3 1 16 
 
Doc 2.: Aids Fund. 2013. Universal Access? Not without Rights!; Achievements of Bridging the Gaps; Health and Rights 
for Key Populations. 1-25. 
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power - 1 - - 1 
Cognitive Power 1 4 1 - 6 
Social Power - 1 - - 1 
Monitorial Power - - - 1 1 
Total 1 6 1 1 9 
 
Doc 3.: Aids Fund. 2013. Ticking the Boxes Project in South Africa; Injecting Drugs: What Men Should Know. 1-15   
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power 26 5 - - 31 
Cognitive Power 5 51 - - 56 
Social Power - - - - - 
Monitorial Power - - - - - 
Total 31 56 - - 87 
 
Doc 4.: Aids Fund. 2014. Coming Out of the Drug Closet. 1-2.   
 Symbolic Power Cognitive Power Social Power Monitorial Power Total 
Symbolic Power - 3 - - 3 
Cognitive Power 3 14 2 - 19 
Social Power - 2 1 - 3 
Monitorial Power - - - 2 2 
Total 3 19 3 2 27 
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Appendix 3: Interview with Mr. Vermeulen, program director BtG  
Interview held on June 5, 2015. 
 
Start: 14:50PM 
 
Question: “What country characteristics does Bridging the Gaps take into account when 
determining the advocacy strategy for a given project?” 
Answer: “My first reaction would be that what is special about Bridging the Gaps is that, when it 
comes to advocacy especially, we have a bottom-up approach. So, it is not us in Amsterdam saying 
that you need to use this kind of advocacy approach in Vietnam or this approach in Uganda. Our 
country partners, which are usually community-led organizations, are the ones that know best what 
kind of change is needed in a country, which policy-makers to influence and in what way they can best 
influence those policy-makers. So, I think overall we decided that from Bridging the Gaps we have a 
clear focus on advocacy, so on policy change, but there is not an overarching strategy on advocacy. 
Because from our point of view that would not work, considering the different populations we work 
with, but also the different countries and regions we work in. I think what we did at the beginning of 
Bridging the Gaps is in all the countries we had semi-structured baseline studies, to determine what is 
the situation in a country, also in the field of the legal situation, so policies in place there, protective or 
restrictive policies, and working together with the partners there to determine what is needed. I think 
because Bridging the Gaps is not one organization that leads the entire program – we are a coalition of 
partners – it is really a tailored made situation based on those semi-structured baselines and needs 
assessments that determine what we can do. I think also for example Kenya, for the sex workers 
program, we work mostly with a service provider in Kenya, which already restricts very much the kind 
of advocacy that you do, because an organization that runs mobile clinics has a very different character 
than a sex worker-led human rights organization. Our strategy is that we do this bottom-up.” 
Q: “What role does a country’s regime type play when determining the advocacy activities?”  
A: “I think for example if you look at a country like Vietnam, which is officially a communist country 
or a communist system, what we saw with our partner there is that they had a very strong advocacy the 
last five years on closing the detention centers for sex workers and working with them, but actually 
just by supporting them and then setting the strategy, they work within that communist system. So, it 
really is looking at who do you know in the party that can assist your cause, what are the fears of the 
country when sex work policies are liberated and I think very practical at a certain point working 
together with the sort of research department if you can say that from the communist party, setting up 
a survey among key stakeholders or key people within the communist party. They have a special 
research department within the communist party to determine what high-ranking officials in the 
communist party think about a more liberal sex work policy. And I think that is something you could 
never do in a more democratic setting, because there is no such thing as a party apparatus in which you 
could do that. That is completely different for example to the way we work in Kenya, which has a 
more democratic system [than Vietnam] on paper, but is also very much different with different ruling 
parties linked very closely to different tribes. Coming in then, at that point, in a very different system 
you could never do such a survey among key policy-makers or key high-ranking officials. The system 
makes that you want to operate... if you are doing advocacy you want to change policy. Therefore, you 
want to look at where an entry point is and the kind of system that is in place changes where you can 
find those entry points. In a more democratic system with a very strong parliament parliamentarians 
play a completely different role and can be much more powerful than perhaps in a more communist 
system where parliamentarians are also there but they are thought of to be more in line with what the 
party thinks. So, parliamentarians in Vietnam were not one of the groups we focus on very much; we 
focused on much more on key people within the ministries, because they were much more powerful.” 
Q: “Does regime type also influence the use of certain advocacy strategies?” 
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A: “I do not think that it necessarily... I do not think we approach it from that point of view. So we do 
not think about what kind of regime is there in this country and thereby we will implement this kind of 
program. I do think because the partners we work with they are in the lead in what we do and I think, 
to mention an example that is not from Bridging the Gaps but I know from China, which has a 
completely different system of course than for example South-Africa, is that the prevalence among sex 
workers in China is very, very low, while in South-Africa it is like 80 percent of the sex workers that 
in certain areas is HIV positive. You see that because the communist system is not influenced by 
religious beliefs that much, but also because once a decision is made within that system it will be 
implemented throughout the system with much more pace than it would be in a democratic system or 
in a system where you work with for example Kenya where regional governments... the situation in 
Mombasa is much different than in Nairobi, because of the federal system that is in place. So, it is 
regime, but it is also the way that that regime is then sort of... how the political system is organized 
within that regime. I think you would expect that a democratic country would have better results but 
then if you look at the prevalence among sex workers you see that in China – and if that is directly 
linked to the regime I do not know – but we see very different numbers than compared to democratic 
South-Africa.” 
Q: “Are adjustments in advocacy strategies purposefully made based on the regime type of a 
country?” 
A: “My answer on that is definitely yes. But then again, it comes back to... I think it is a very Dutch 
way of working so perhaps it does not look that special but if you look at the American way of 
working, which is very much top-down, also in countries with local U.S. aid agencies working from 
the embassies saying this is how we are going to do it, which then leads to very peculiar situation 
because you are not working with the context you are at. I think by working with our country partners 
always in the lead and saying this is how it works in this country and this is the best strategy to reach 
those people that is not something that we as Aids Fund or the Bridging the Gaps Alliance think about 
it: we thought about it and we thought that the best way to do it is to put the local partners in the lead, 
because they are best informed on what kind of tactics are effective. And of course, the tactics that 
come out of that take into consideration the regime, because that is the context that they are in. So, 
everything we do is based on the context and then on the political system that is in place, because that 
is why we chose for this system in the first place: to make sure that that is the case. And I think it is 
the only way you could do that. I do not think there is a way that you can have a centrally organized 
program that sort of scans a country and says okay we decided here in Amsterdam that Kenya has this 
kind of system and therefore we need to influence these people. You can only do that from within a 
country and especially because you really need to know a country very well to understand how 
parliaments work, how ministries work. What etiquettes are where, where parliamentarians go for 
dinner, what their place is within the party, who will be the next kingmaker. You cannot do that from a 
bureau in Paris or in Washington. You need to be in the country for many, many years to understand 
that system.” 
Q: “Could you explain how such adjustments are expressed in the cases of Kenya and South-
Africa?” 
A: “One of the differences we see between Kenya and South-Africa is that South-Africa has more 
protective policies in place, so protective laws in place. So, gay marriage is legal, there are protective 
laws against rape, the situation for sex workers is not ideal but there is some kind of protection. In 
Kenya that is not the case, so in Kenya what we do in the field of advocacy is mostly changing those 
laws, while in South-Africa we are in the situation that the law is perhaps protective but then the 
implementation of the law is not being done in a way that it leads to results, so the laws or the people 
that need to implement the policies are not sensitized for example to the needs of key populations. So, 
you could say there is a law in place that says that health care providers cannot stigmatize their clients, 
but they still do. So changing the laws is just the start of something and I think in the more democratic 
South-Africa many other reasons are there for why they are there; the kind of regime is not the only 
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reason. We see that the laws are in place, but we are now working on how we get those laws 
implemented in society, so that they actually benefit the people. And I think in Kenya we are still 
much more focused on getting the right laws in place or making sure that more harmful laws are not 
replacing the laws that are already in place. When it comes to the rights of LGBT there is a lot of 
influence out of Uganda into Kenya to create more restrictive laws. So yes, getting the right laws into 
place in Kenya and making sure in South-Africa that the ones in place are implemented socially. This 
asks for a different kind of advocacy: I think putting the right laws in place means you are working 
with law-makers and therefore parliamentarians; with implementing laws you go to regional 
governments and the civil society. Just like in the Netherlands, the implementation of law usually goes 
down to a more local level and there you also have policy-makers that have to decide on budgets, 
allocation to hospitals, prioritizing certain interventions. So we see that there we also have to advocate 
on different levels.” 
 
End: 15:06PM 
